A large amount of crypto companies had their domains stolen. The only similarity between the domains was that they were all SquareSpace domains that were migrated over from Google Domains after the merger. This article is explains the incident response that was done.
When migrating the ownership of a domain, the domain owner or any collaborator would be granted the domain manager permission on SquareSpace. Since most Google Domains users were not mapped to SquareSpace, they did a pre-emptive mapping from the Google email to the SquareSpace. Once they logged in, they had access to the domain.
SquareSpace has many login options, such as continue with Google, Facebook and regular logins. Since this was coming from Google, the developers likely assumed that all of the domains would be owned by gmail accounts.
SquareSpace has many login options, such as continue with Google, Facebook and regular logins. Since this was coming from Google, the developers likely assumed that all of the domains would be owned by gmail accounts. The threat actor had stolen a lot of domains and had planted plenty of backdoors to the system for when they got caught. SEAL coordinated the recovery of lots of domains and helped mitigate these backdoor techniques.
The author of the post has a few notes for security teams...
- First, defense in depth matters. Yukikey 2FA and monitoring with alarms are great things to have.
- Second, re-evaluate the attack surface of your system when external things change.
- Third, minimize special cases in your system; the assumptions you made before in security can break with a small change like this one.
- Emails need to be validated. That's a really stupid thing that would have prevented all of this.
Overall, a great post into a really big deal for the industry with some great lessons along the way.